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ABSTRACT
This paper describes a verification case study on an autonomous
racing car with a neural network (NN) controller. Although several
verification approaches have been proposed over the last year, they
have only been evaluated on low-dimensional systems or systems
with constrained environments. To explore the limits of existing
approaches, we present a challenging benchmark in which the NN
takes raw LiDAR measurements as input and outputs steering for
the car. We train a dozen NNs using two reinforcement learning al-
gorithms and show that the state of the art in verification can handle
systems with around 40 LiDAR rays, well short of a typical LiDAR
scan with 1081 rays. Furthermore, we perform real experiments to
investigate the benefits and limitations of verification with respect
to the sim2real gap, i.e., the difference between a system’s modeled
and real performance. We identify cases, similar to the modeled
environment, in which verification is strongly correlated with safe
behavior. Finally, we illustrate LiDAR fault patterns that can be
used to develop robust and safe reinforcement learning algorithms.
1 INTRODUCTION
Neural networks (NNs) have shown great promise in multiple ap-
plication domains, including safety-critical systems such as au-
tonomous driving [5] and air traffic collision avoidance systems [16].
At the same time, widespread adoption of NN-based autonomous
systems is hindered by the fact that NNs often fail in seemingly
unpredictable ways: slight perturbations in their inputs can result
in drastically different outputs, as is the case with adversarial exam-
ples [26]. Such issues might lead to fatal outcomes in safety-critical
systems [4] and thus underscore the need to assure the safety of
NN-based systems before they can be deployed at scale.
One way to reason about the safety of such systems is to for-
mally verify safety properties of a NN’s outputs for certain sensi-
tive inputs, as proposed in several NN verification and robustness
works [10, 11, 17, 28, 29]. However, safety of the NN does not im-
mediately imply safety of the entire autonomous system. A more
exhaustive approach is to consider the interaction between the NN
and the physical plant (e.g., a car), trace the evolution of the plant’s
states (e.g., position, velocity) over time and ensure all reachable
states are safe. A few such methods were recently developed to ver-
ify safety of autonomous systems with NN controllers [9, 15, 25, 27].
These techniques combine ideas from classical dynamical system
reachability [7, 18, 27] (e.g., view the NN as a hybrid system) with
NN verification approaches (e.g., cast NN verification as a mixed
integer linear program). However, these approaches have so far
been evaluated on fairly simple systems: either systems with low-
dimensional NN inputs (the inputs are the plant states, e.g., position
and velocity [9, 15, 27]) or with constrained environments (e.g., Li-
DAR orientation does not change over time [25]).
Two main challenges remain in applying verification techniques
to realistic systems. The first one is scalability. There are (at least)
two aspects to this challenge: 1) scalability with respect to (w.r.t)
the plant dynamics and 2) and scalability w.r.t. the NN complexity.
The reachability problem is undecidable for general hybrid sys-
tems [3], which means existing approaches can only approximate
the reachable sets. The NN adds additional complexity both due to
size and due to the number of inputs to the NN – it is much more
challenging to compute reachable sets for multivariate functions,
even for small NNs. At the same time, having the capability to verify
systems with high-dimensional measurements is crucial, since NNs
are most useful exactly in such settings.
The second verification challenge is the sim2real gap, i.e., the
difference between a system’s modeled and real performance [6].
Analyzing the sim2real gap is essential as it allows us to explore
the benefit of verification with the respect to the real system. Over-
coming this challenge would enable developers to design and test
approaches in simulation with the assurance that safety properties
that hold in simulation would carry over to the real world.
In order to illustrate these difficulties and to provide a challeng-
ing benchmark for future work, this paper presents a verification
case study on a realistic NN-controlled autonomous system. In par-
ticular, we focus on the F1/10 autonomous racing car [1], which
needs to navigate a structured environment using high-dimensional
LiDAR measurements. This case study has two goals: 1) assess the
capabilities of existing verification approaches and highlight aspects
that require future work; 2) investigate conditions under which the
verification translates to safe performance in the real world.
To perform the verification, we first identify a dynamics (bicycle)
model of the F1/10 car, as well as an observation model mapping the
vehicle state to the LiDARmeasurements. To obtain the observation
model, we assume the car operates in a structured environment (i.e.,
a sequence of hallways) such that each LiDAR ray can be calculated
based on the car’s state and the surrounding walls. Given these
models, we train an end-to-end NN controller using reinforcement
learning [20]. The controller takes LiDAR measurements as input
and produces steering commands as output (assuming constant
throttle). Once the NN is trained, we aim to verify that the car does
not crash in the hallway walls.
We evaluate the scalability of existing verification approaches
by varying the NN size, the number of LiDAR rays as well as the
training algorithm. Note that the complexity of the verification task
grows exponentially with the number of rays since, depending on
the uncertainty, a given ray could reach different walls, which trig-
gers multiple paths in the hybrid observation model that need to be
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verified simultaneously. We use the state-of-the-art tool Verisig [15]
to verify the dozen setups that were trained; we could not encode
the hybrid LiDAR model in the other existing tools. In our evalua-
tion, Verisig could handle NNs of roughly 250 neurons (containing
two layers with 128 neurons each) and LiDAR scans with around
40 rays. This highlights the challenge of this verification task: veri-
fying the entire LiDAR scan containing 1081 rays, together with a
corresponding NN that can effectively process such a scan, remains
well beyond the capabilities of existing tools.
Finally, we perform experiments, using the verified controllers,
to evaluate the system’s sim2real gap. This gap is especially pro-
nounced with LiDAR measurements, since rays can get reflected
depending on the reached surface, thereby providing an erroneous
distance. We first evaluate the benefit of verification in an ideal set-
ting by performing experiments with all reflective surfaces covered
– all NNs performed similarly in this setup, resulting in safe behav-
ior roughly 90% of the time; even in these cases crashes were caused
by LiDAR faults that could not be completely eliminated. However,
more crashes were observed in the unmodified environment, as
caused by consistently bad LiDAR data. Upon closer investigation,
we identified patterns of LiDAR faults that reproduce the unsafe
behavior in simulations as well – however, we could not train a
robust controller using the state-of-the-art reinforcement learning
algorithms. Thus, it remains an open problem to train (and verify) a
NN that provides safe performance in the presence of LiDAR errors.
In summary, this paper has three contributions: 1) a challenging
benchmark for verification and reinforcement learning in neural-
network-controlled autonomous systems with high-dimensional
measurements; 2) an exhaustive evaluation of a state-of-the-art ver-
ification tool on this benchmark; 3) real experiments that illustrate
the benefits and limitations of verification w.r.t. the sim2real gap.
2 SYSTEM OVERVIEW
This section summarizes the different parts of the case study con-
sidered in the paper. We first describe the F1/10 platform, followed
by a high-level introduction to reinforcement learning and hybrid
system verification.
2.1 The F1/10 Autonomous Racing Car
The case study considered in this paper is inspired by the F1/10
Autonomous Racing Competition [1], where an autonomous car
must navigate a structured environment (i.e., the track) as fast as
possible. The F1/10 car is shown in Figure 1. It is built for racing
purposes and can reach up to 40mph. The car is controlled by an
onboard chip such as the NVIDIA Jetson TX2 module.
A diagram of the closed-loop system is shown in Figure 2. The
car operates in a hallway environment; without loss of generality,
we assume that all turns are 90-degree right turns such that the
“track” is effectively a square. Although in the competition the car
has access to a number of sensors, in this case study we assume the
controller only has access to LiDAR measurements. The measure-
ments are sent to a NN controller that outputs a steering command
to the vehicle. We assume that the car operates at constant throt-
tle, in order to keep the dynamics model and the verification task
manageable. The car’s dynamic and observation models used in the
case study are described in Section 3.
2.2 Reinforcement Learning
Overall, developing a robust controller for the F1/10 car is a chal-
lenging task, both due to the difficulty of analyzing LiDAR mea-
surements and to the speed and agility of the car. Thus, this is a
good application for reinforcement learning [20], where no knowl-
edge of the car dynamics or the observation model is required. In
reinforcement learning, the controller starts by applying a control
action and observing a reward. As training proceeds, the learning
problem is to maximize the reward by exploring the state space
and trying different controls. In recent years, deep reinforcement
learning (where controllers are neural networks) has shown great
promise in a number of traditionally challenging problems, such
as playing Atari games [21], controlling autonomous cars [5] and
playing board games [24]. Hence, reinforcement learning is a nat-
ural choice for learning a controller for the F1/10 car as well; the
specific training approach is described in Section 4.
2.3 Hybrid System and NN Verification
The hybrid system verification problem can be stated at a high
level as follows: given a hybrid model of the plant dynamics and
observations, the problem is to trace the evolution of the plant
states over time (for a set of initial conditions) and verify that no
unsafe states can be reached. Although hybrid system reachability
is undecidable except for special cases such as linear systems [3, 19]
(see [2, 8] for an exhaustive discussion), several approaches work
well for specific non-linear systems. In particular, reachability is δ -
decidable for Type 2 computable functions [18], which has led to the
development of the tool dReach. Alternatively, Flow* [7] constructs
Taylor model (TM) approximations of the system’s reachable set.
While Flow* provides no decidability claims, it can verify interesting
properties for multiple non-linear systems classes and scales well
when using TMs with interval analysis.
Recently, several approaches were developed for verification of
hybrid systems with NNs controllers [9, 15, 25, 27]. As described in
Section 1, the NN introduces new challenges both due to its size and
complexity. To address this issue, the proposed approaches borrow
ideas from classical hybrid system reachability, e.g., by transforming
the NN into a mixed-integer linear program (MILP) [9], a satisfia-
bility modulo theory (SMT) formula [25] or an equivalent hybrid
system [15]. Although existing tools have shown promising scala-
bility in terms of the size of the NN, they have only been evaluated
on low-dimensional systems or systems with constrained environ-
ments. In this paper, we provide a much more challenging scenario,
with a high-dimensional hybrid observation model, in order to test
the limits of these tools and to highlight avenues for future work.
2.4 System Design and Development
In order to build and verify the system, we perform the following
steps: 1) build a model of the car dynamics and observations; 2) train
a NN on the model using reinforcement learning; 3) verify that the
NN-controlled car is safe with respect to the model; 4) perform real
experiments to analyze the sim2real gap. The following sections
describe each of these steps in more detail.
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Figure 1: Navigation scenario. There are
three different regions depending on how
many walls can be reached using LiDAR.
Figure 2: Overview of the closed-loop system and the problem considered
in this paper.
3 PLANT MODEL
This section describes the F1/10 car’s dynamical and observation
models. These models are used to train the NN controller (Section 4)
and to perform the closed-loop system verification (Section 5).
3.1 Dynamics model
We use a bicycle model [22, 23] to model the car’s dynamics, which
is a standard model for cars with front steering. Specifically, we
use a kinematic bicycle model since it has few parameters (that
are easy to identify) and tracks reasonably well at low speeds, i.e.,
under 5 m/s [23]. In the kinematic bicycle model, the car has four
states: position in two dimensions, linear velocity and heading. The
continuous-time dynamics are given by the following equations:
Ûx = vcos(θ + β)
Ûy = vsin(θ + β)
Ûv = −cav + cacm (u − ch )
Ûθ = Vcos(β)
lf + lr
tan(δ )
β = tan−1
(
lr tan(δ )
lf + lr
)
,
(1)
wherev is the car’s linear velocity, θ is the car’s orientation, β is the
car’s slip angle and x and y are the car’s position; u is the throttle
input, and δ is the heading input; ca is an acceleration constant, cm
is a car motor constant, ch is a hysteresis constant, and lf and lr
are the distances from the car’s center of mass to the front and rear,
respectively. Since tan−1 is not supported by most hybrid system
verification tools, we assume that β = 0; this is not a limiting as-
sumption in the considered case study as the slip angle is typically
fairly small at low speeds; we did not observe significant differ-
ences in the model’s predictive power due to this assumption. After
performing system identification, we obtained the following param-
eter values: ca = 1.633, cm = 0.2, ch = 4, lf = 0.225m, lr = 0.225m.
Finally, we assume a constant throttle u = 16 (resulting in a top
speed of roughly 2.4 m/s), i.e., the controller only controls heading.
We emphasize that the plant model is fairly non-linear, thus making
it difficult to compute reachable sets for the car’s states.
3.2 Observation model
The F1/10 car has access to LiDAR measurements only. As shown
in Figure 1, a typical LiDAR scan consists of a number of rays
emanating from -135 to 135 degrees relative to the car’s heading.
For each ray, the car receives the distance to the first obstacle the
ray hits; if there are no obstacles within the LiDAR range, the car
receives the maximum range. In this case study, we consider a
LiDAR scan with a maximum of 1081 rays and a range of 5 meters.1
As shown in Figure 1, there are three possible regions the car can
be in, depending on how many walls can be reached using LiDAR.
The worst case is Region 2, in which there are four walls to consider.
We present the measurement model for Region 2 only since the
other regions are special cases of Region 2. Let α1, . . . ,α1081 denote
the relative angles for each ray with respect to the car’s heading,
i.e., α1 = −135,α2 = −134.75, . . . ,α1081 = 135. One can determine
which wall each LiDAR ray hits by comparing the αi for that ray
with the relative angles to the two corners of that turn, θl and θr
in Figure 1. The measurement model for Region 2 (for a right turn)
is presented below, for i ∈ {1, . . . , 1081}:
yik =

drk/cos(90 + θk + αi ) if θk + αi ≤ θr
dbk /cos(180 + θk + αi ) if θr < θk + αi ≤ −90
dtk/cos(θk + αi ) if − 90 < θk + αi ≤ θl
dlk/cos(90 − θk − αi ) if θl < θk + αi ,
(2)
where k is the sampling step (the sampling rate is assumed to be
10Hz), dtk ,d
b
k ,d
l
k ,d
r
k are distances to the four walls, as illustrated
in Figure 1, and can be derived from the car’s position (x ,y).2
1Although typical LiDARs have a longer range than 5m, we found our unit’s measure-
ments to be unreliable beyond 5m.
2If θk + αi < [−180, 180], θk + αi needs to be normalized by adding/subtracting 360.
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Similar to the dynamics model, the measurement model is non-
linear. Furthermore, keeping the approximation error small during
the reachability analysis is challenging since if a ray is almost
parallel to a wall, small uncertainty in the car’s heading results in
large uncertainty in the measured distance for that ray, which is
evident in the division by cosine in the measurement model.
4 CONTROLLER TRAINING
Asmentioned in Section 2, the F1/10 case study is a good application
domain for deep reinforcement learning (DRL) due to the high-
dimensional measurements as well as the non-trivial control policy
that is required. This section discusses the DRL algorithms used in
the case study as well as the choice of reward function.
Multiple DRL algorithms have been proposed in the past few
years, depending on the learning setup. In settings with a discrete
number of control actions, the standard approach is to use a deep
Q-network [21], as inspired by the idea of Q learning, i.e., learning
the (Q) function that maps a state and an action to the maximum
expected reward that can be achieved by taking that action. In the
case of continuous actions, a deep deterministic policy gradient
(DDPG) approach [20] was developed that approximates the Q
function using a Bellman equation. Notably, DDPG uses two NNs
while training, a critic that learns the Q function and an actor that
applies the controls. Once training is finished, only the actor is used
as the actual controller. Multiple approaches have been proposed
to improve upon DDPG, especially in terms of training stability,
e.g., using normalized advanced functions (NAFs) [14], which are a
continuous version of Q functions, or using a twin delayed deep
deterministic policy gradient (TD3) algorithm [13] that employs
two critics for greater stability. Finally, model-based DRL algorithms
have also been proposed where the NN architecture is designed to
implicitly learn the plant model in order to improve training [12].
In this paper, we focus on the continuous-action-space algo-
rithms as they fit better the F1/10 car control task. For better evalu-
ation, we train controllers using two different algorithms, namely
DDPG and TD3 (we could not train good controllers using the
authors’ implementation of the NAF-based approach).
An important consideration in any DRL problem is the choice
of reward function. In particular, we are interested in a reward
function that not only results in better training but also in “smooth”
control policies that are easier to verify. Thus, the reward function
consists of two parts: 1) a positive gain for every step that does not
result in a crash (to enforce safe control) and 2) a negative gain
penalizing higher control inputs (to enforce smooth control):
rk = дp − дnδ2k , (3)
where дp = 10, дn = 0.05. A large negative reward of -100 is
received if the car crashes. Note that the negative input gain is not
applied in turns in order to avoid a local optimum while training.
Another hyper parameter in the training setup is the NN archi-
tecture. Although convolutional NNs are easier to train with high-
dimensional inputs, they are harder to verify by existing tools since
each convolutional layer needs to be unrolled in a fully connected
layer with a large number of neurons. Thus, we only consider fully
connected architectures in this case study. Scaling to convolutional
NNs is thus an important avenue for future work in NN verification.
5 VERIFICATION EVALUATION
Having described the NN controller training process, we now evalu-
ate the scalability of a state-of-the-art verification tool, Verisig [15].
As mentioned in Section 1, the other existing tools cannot currently
handle the hybrid observation model. In the considered scenario,
the car starts from a 20cm-wide range in the middle of the hallway
(as illustrated in Figure 1) and runs for 7s. This is enough time for
the car to reach top speed before the first turn and to get roughly to
the middle of the next hallway. The safety property to be verified
is that car is never within 0.3m of either wall.
Verisig can only handle NNs with smooth activation functions
(i.e., sigmoid and hyperbolic tangent) and works by transforming
the NN into an equivalent hybrid system. The NN’s hybrid system
is then composed with the plant’s hybrid system, thereby casting
the problem as a hybrid system verification problem that is solved
by Flow*. In Verisig’s original evaluation [15], the tool scales to
NNs with about 100 neurons per layer and a dozen layers. The high-
dimensional input space considered in this case study, however,
presents a greater challenge which might also affect the tool’s
scalability in terms of the NN size.
Since Verisig only accepts NNs with smooth activations, all NNs
in this case study have hyperbolic tangent (tanh) activations. The
output layer also has a tanh activation, which is scaled by 15 so
that the control input ranges from -15 to 15 degrees.3 As described
in Section 4, we use both the DDPG and TD3 algorithms to explore
different aspects of the verification process. All NNs have two
hidden fully connected layers; the number of neurons per layer is
increased from 64 to 128. We also vary the number of LiDAR rays
from 21 to 41 and finally to 61 in order to evaluate the scalability in
terms of the input dimension as well.4 For repeatability purposes,
we train three controllers for each setup in the 21-ray case.
The verification times5 for all the setups are presented in Ta-
ble 1, together with other verification artifacts. Note that the initial
interval is split in smaller subsets in order to maintain the approxi-
mation error small – the verification is performed separately for
each subset. For each setup, only average statistics over all subsets
are presented. As can be seen in the table, the biggest setup that
Verisig can handle has roughly 40 LiDAR rays. The verification
complexity in terms of the number of LiDAR rays is reflected in the
number-of-paths column in the table, which indicates the average
number of paths in the hybrid observation model caused by the fact
that a LiDAR ray could potentially reach different walls – note that
smaller-NN setups can take longer to verify simply due to a higher
number of paths since each path needs to be verified separately.
A second important observation is that the NN verification time
is roughly 10% of the total verification time. This suggests that plant
verification, especially the observation model, is much more chal-
lenging than NN verification. Thus, the scalability of verification
needs to be greatly improved not only in terms of the NN size but
also in terms of the plant complexity.
3The dynamics model assumes the controls are given in radians – we use degrees in
the paper for clearer presentation.
4Note that, due to hardware issues with our LiDAR unit, we only used the rays ranging
from -115 to 115 degrees (instead of the full scan ranging from -135 to 135 degrees).
5All experiments were run on a 80-core machine running at 1.2GHz. However, Flow*
is not parallelized, so the only benefit from the multicore processor is the fact that
multiple verification instances can be run at the same time.
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DRL algorithm NN setup # LiDAR rays Controller index Initial interval size NN ver. time (s) Total ver. time (s) # paths
DDPG 64 × 64 21 1 0.2cm 355 4126 1.32
DDPG 64 × 64 21 2 0.2cm 347 4122 1.15
DDPG 64 × 64 21 3 DNF
DDPG 128 × 128 21 1 DNF
DDPG 128 × 128 21 2 DNF
DDPG 128 × 128 21 3 DNF
TD3 64 × 64 21 1 0.5cm 553 4731 2.2
TD3 64 × 64 21 2 0.5cm 853 8094 2.825
TD3 64 × 64 21 3 0.5cm 724 8641 2.725
TD3 128 × 128 21 1 0.5cm 197 3760 1.6
TD3 128 × 128 21 2 0.5cm 355 5954 1.775
TD3 128 × 128 21 3 Verisig/Flow* crash
TD3 64 × 64 41 1 0.2cm* 634 11915 2.194
TD3 128 × 128 41 1 DNF
TD3 64 × 64 61 1 DNF
TD3 128 × 128 61 1 DNF
Table 1: Verification evaluation for various setups in terms of NN architectures and number of LiDAR rays. The verification
times and the number of paths are averaged over all subsets for each setup. Subset sizes are decreased from 0.5cm to 0.2cm and
to 0.1cm, if verification fails. DNF setups were terminated after 10 hours on 0.1cm subsets. The notation n × n means that this
is a NN with two hidden layers and n neurons per layer. Note that 2 out of 100 instances of the 41-ray setup did not terminate
within 24 hours (and were killed), which highlights the complexity of the larger setup.
(a) DDPG, 64 × 64, controller 1. (b) DDPG, 128 × 128, controller 2. (c) TD3, 64 × 64, controller 1. (d) TD3, 128 × 128, controller 1.
Figure 3: Simulation traces for different NN controllers from Table 1.
DRL algorithm NN architecture # LiDAR rays Controller Index Safe outcomes in EnvM Safe outcomes in EnvU
DDPG 64 × 64 21 1 9/10 0/10
DDPG 64 × 64 21 2 9/10 2/10
DDPG 64 × 64 21 3 10/10 8/10
DDPG 128 × 128 21 1 10/10 8/10
DDPG 128 × 128 21 2 7/10 4/10
DDPG 128 × 128 21 3 9/10 0/10
TD3 64 × 64 21 1 8/10 9/10
TD3 64 × 64 21 2 10/10 9/10
TD3 64 × 64 21 3 10/10 9/10
TD3 128 × 128 21 1 9/10 9/10
TD3 128 × 128 21 2 9/10 9/10
TD3 128 × 128 21 3 9/10 9/10
Table 2: Sim2real gap for the 21-ray setups from Table 1. Ten 7s runs were performed for each setup in each environment,
where EnvM and EnvU refer to the modified and unmodified environments, respectively. A safe outcome is recorded if the car
does not hit a wall during a run.Finally, we note that the subset size is an indication of the dif-
ficulty of verifying a given NN. The subset was decreased when
the uncertainty was so high that the safety property could not be
verified (some NNs could not be verified even for the smallest subset
size tried in our evaluation). Thus, a smaller subset size means that
a NN is potentially less robust to input perturbations. To illustrate
this point, we plot simulation traces for two NNs that either re-
quired reducing the subset size or could not be verified at all and for
two NNs that were verified with the original subset size of 0.5cm.
The traces are shown in Figure 3. As can be seen, the first two NNs
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Figure 4: LiDAR scans that led to crashes in experiments.
are very sensitive to their inputs and produce drastically different
traces depending on the initial condition. As shown in Section 6,
these NNs also result in unsafe behavior in the real world.
6 EXPLORING THE SIM2REAL GAP
Having evaluated the scalability of current verification tools, we
now investigate the benefits and limitations of verification w.r.t the
real system. We perform experiments in an environment that is
identical to the verified one in terms of hallway dimensions, the
main difference being that the real environment contains reflec-
tive surfaces that sometimes greatly affect LiDAR measurements.
Specifically, we note that the LiDAR model presented in Section 3
is fairly accurate when no reflections occur; however, when a ray
is reflected, it appears as if no obstacle exists in that direction.
In order to assess the benefit of verification in an ideal envi-
ronment, we first cover most reflective surfaces and perform 10
runs per NN setup. All outcomes are reported in Table 2. As can be
seen in the table, roughly 10% of runs in the modified environment
were unsafe, uniformly spread across different NNs, thus indicating
that the LiDAR model is fairly accurate when no reflections occur
and that the verification result is strongly correlated with safe per-
formance. We emphasize that LiDAR faults occurred even in this
environment – Figure 4a shows a LiDAR scan that caused a crash.
Table 2 also shows that more crashes were observed in the un-
modified environment, due to multiple failing LiDAR rays (one
scan that led to a crash is shown in Figure 4b). Interestingly, it is
possible to produce similar behavior in simulations as well – Fig-
ure 5 shows the same runs as those in Figure 3, but with five LiDAR
rays randomly missing around the area of the turn, similar to the
pattern observed in Figure 4b. The behavior illustrated in Figure 5
is very similar to the real outcomes reported in Table 2, e.g., we
observe multiple crashes for setups DDPG 64× 64, controller 1, and
DDPG 128 × 128, controller 2, while the TD3 NNs are more robust
to missing rays. However, although we can reproduce the LiDAR
fault model fairly well, training a NN that is robust to such faults
is challenging and was not possible with the DRL algorithms used
in the case study. Thus, it remains an open problem to train and
verify a robust NN for the problem considered in this paper.
7 DISCUSSION AND FUTUREWORK
This paper presented a challenging verification case study in which
an autonomous racing car with a NN controller navigates a struc-
tured environment using LiDAR measurements only. We evaluated
a state-of-the-art verification tool, Verisig, on this benchmark and
illustrated that current tools can handle only a small fraction of
the rays in a typical LiDAR scan. Furthermore, we performed real
experiments to assess the benefits of verification in terms of the
sim2real gap. Our findings suggest that numerous improvements
are necessary in order to address all issues raised by this case study.
Verification scalability in terms of the plant model. As illustrated
in the verification results in Section 5, the verification complexity
scales exponentially with the number of LiDAR rays. Thus, it is
necessary to develop a scalable approach that addresses this issue.
For example, one could use the structure of the environment in
order to develop an assume-guarantee approach such that verifying
long traces may not be required.
Verification scalability in terms of the NN. Quantifying scalability
in terms of the NN is not straightforward since a large, but smooth,
NN may be easier to verify than a small, but sensitive, one, as
indicated in Table 1. Yet, it is clear that existing tools need to scale
beyond a few hundred neurons in order to handle convolutional
NNs, which are much more effective in high-dimensional settings
such as the one described in this paper. While there exist tools that
can verify properties about convolutional NNs in isolation [28],
achieving such scalability in closed-loop systems remains an open
problem, partly due to the complexity of the plant model as well.
Robustness of DRL. Although DRL has seen great successes in
the last few years, it is still a challenge to train safe and robust
controllers, especially in high-dimensional problems. As shown
in Section 6, LiDAR faults can be reproduced fairly reliably in
simulation; yet, we could not train a robust controller using state-of-
the-art learning techniques. Thus, it is essential to develop methods
that focus on robustness and repeatability, with the final goal of
being able to verify the robustness of the resulting controllers.
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